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Acursory examination of studies based on census data reveals that
earnings increase with education and that the social rate of return
to education is at least equal to the return available to society on
other investments (Becker, 1964; H. Miller, 1960). The proposi-
tion that education can be treated as an investment in human
capital has proved to be powerful and illuminating in its own
right and to be a major ingredient in studies of the sources of
economic growth and the distribution of income (Becker, 1964;
Denison, 1964; H. Miller, 1960; Schultz, 1963). Central to all
these studies are two testable hypotheses. First, the (observed
or adjusted) differences in earnings by educational level represent
the net effect of education, rather than some other personal charac-
teristics that have not been held constant. Second, these differences
in earnings represent increasesinproductivity produced by
education.
It has long been recognized that systematic differences in earn-
ings may not be due solely to differences in educational attainment
(Becker, 1964; Wolfie & Smith, 1956) and that the omission of a
variable positively correlated with education and with a separate
and positive influence on earnings biases the education coefficient
upward. Many people have hypothesized that, in particular, the
omission of mental ability and family background will result in
such a bias. Although attempts have been made in a number of
studies to standardize for family background and other determi-
NOTE:This study was partially financed through the NBER by a grant from
the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. While we have benefited
greatly from discussions with many colleagues at the NBER and our univer-
sities, we especially wish to thank F. T. Juster and R. Summers for their long
and patient discussions. Also, as the reader will soon realize, this study would
not have been possible without the aid of R. Thorndike, to whom we are most
grateful.
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nants of earnings, no studies of education based on large samples
contain the relevant earnings, ability, and education information.'
Therefore, our first goal was to obtain good estimates of the rate
of return to education at various ability and educational levels.
Because of data limitations, specific estimates were restricted to
returns for higher education, i.e., education beyond the twelfth
grade. For the same reasons, only the education of males was
considered.
Most studies of the rate of return to education are based on the
premise that differences in earnings at different educational levels
arise because of the various cognitive and affective skills produced
by education. However, this need not be the case. The differentials
might arise because the lack of educational credentials is a barrier
to entry to high-paying occupations. If this is the case, the social
rate of return to education is lower than the private rate, ignoring
costs involved in other methods of sorting people.
Although many people have suggested that a primary role of edu-
cation is to serve as a screening, certification, or licensing device,
we are aware of no research in which an attempt has been made to
separate the earnings differences due to productivity gains from
those due to screening. Our second goal, therefore, was to examine
the hypothesis that education adds to income by screening people
with low education out of high-paying occupations.
A new and extremely rich data source allowed us to obtain sub-
stantially improved estimates of the (private and social) return to
higher educational attainment and make crude estimates of the
effect of screening on earnings differentials.
In brief, our findings, all of which are subject to qualifications
as given in the text, are the following: First, the realized (real)
rate of return —ignoringconsumption and nonmonetary benefits —
tothe college dropout or graduate isto 9 percent and does not
'Studies for the United States include Ashenfelter and Mooney (1968); Becker
(1964); Bridgman (1930); Cutright (1969); Duncan et a!. (1968); Griliches
and Mason (1972); Hansen, Weisbrod, and Scanlon (1970); Hause (1972);
Hunt (1963); Morgan and David (1963); Rogers (1967); Weisbrod and Karpoff
(1968); and Wolfie and Smith (1956). Except for one segment of the Hause
study, each of these studies suffers from one or more of the following serious
problems: poor measures of education and ability, small and inadequate sample
size, improper statistical technique, or too specialized a sample to permit the
formation of generalizations. In addition, only the Rogers study contains enough
data to permit estimation of a rate of return, as opposed to simply studying
income differentials at a given age. The portion of the Hause study that is based
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vary with the level of mental ability. If we ignore the screening
hypothesis, the private and social rates of return are approximately
the same. Second, certain types of mental ability and various per-
sonal characteristics are as important as education in determining
earnings, and omission of these variables biases education coeffi-
cients upward by up to 35 percent. Finally, and more tentatively,
there is evidence consistent with the hypothesis that education is
used as a screening device and that up to one-half of (net) earnings
differentials are due to such screening.
Two caveats are in order. First, since this study is based pri-
marily on a population that is much brighter and better educated
than average, our results need not apply to the United States popu-
lation as a whole. Second, because of space limitations, we do not
fully document all our assertions here. For more details the inter-
ested reader should consult our larger manuscript (Taubman &
Wales, forthcoming). Appendix A contains a more complete de-
scription of the sample, the follow-up procedures, etc.
Analysis of theInour regressions, we relate earnings in a particular year to a large
NBEA-TH set of explanatory variables, nearly all of which are zero-one dummy
variables. By breaking up the independent variables into discrete
categories (for example, eight education classes) we allow for non-
linear effects, and by combining dummies we allow for interac-
tjons.2 As noted earlier, there are scores on 17 ability tests for each
person. Factor analysis indicates that four orthogonal factors could
be extracted from these scores, two of which quite clearly represent
spatial perception and physical coordination and the other two of
which we treat as measuring mathematical and verbal ability.3
We divide the factors into fifths and use a separate dummy for each
interval because the effect of ability need not be linear. The main
regression equations for both 1955 and 1969—including such mea-
sures as t-statistics, R2, and standard errors —appear in Appendix
B. The equations, estimated by ordinary least squares, include
measures of education, mathematical ability, personal biography,
2Thus our functional form incorporates the one advocated by Mincer (1970).
However, the use of log earnings could still be justified to eliminate hetero-
scedasticity.
3The factor loadings of the tests are given in Appendix B, whereas the tests
themselves are discussed in Thorndike and Hagen (1959). Thorndike believes
our mathematical factor is close to IQ while the verbal factor contains too heavy
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health, marital status, father's education, and age; to account for
nonpecuniary rewards such as shorter work year, they also include
a dummy variable for teachers.4 Nearly all these variables are
significant at the 5 percent level in both years studied, although
a few are significant only in one.
The net earnings differentials due to education at two points in
the life cycle can be calculated from these equations (see Table 4-1).
In 1955, when the average age in the sample was 33, annual earn-
ings of those who attended college were generally 10 to 15 percent
higher than at the high school level, although the differential was
70 percent for M.D.'s, 2 percent for Ph.D.'s, and 20 percent for
LL.B.'s.5 In 1969, those with some college received about 17 per-
cent more income than high school graduates, while those with an
undergraduate degree, some graduate work, and a master's degree
received 25 to 30 percent more.6 Those with Ph.D.'s, LL.B.'s, and
M.D.'s received about 25, 85, and 105 percent more income, re-
spectively, than high school graduates of the same ability level.7
From 1955 to 1969 the differentials increased at all educational
levels, with the greatest percentage increase occurring for the most
highly educated. As explained in more detail later, these dif-
ferentials are independent of ability level except for graduate
students. In some versions of the 1969 equations we replaced the
college-dropout category with the three categories of those who
finished one, two, and three years of college. The coeffident for
completing one year of college is essentially equal to that of the
some-college variable discussed above, whereas the coefficients for
4Father's education is included as a proxy for family background. The personal
biography variable is a weighted average of the two indices labeled pilot bio-
graphy and navigator biography by Thorndike and Hagen. These indices are
in turn weighted averages of information collected in 1943 on hobbies, prior
school studies, and family background. The weights used in constructing these
indices depend on how well the item predicted success in pilot and in navigator
school.
5Although not shown here, the returns to B.A. and B.S. holders are the same.
6These returns correspond to those of wage rates, since average hours worked
are the same at all educational levels except for the combination of Ph.D.,
LL.B., and M.D., in which hours are 8 percent greater than in the lowest cate-
gory.
If a dummy variable is included for business owners (but not self-employed
professionals), the income differential for non-business owners with a bache-
lor's degree is raised by 25 percent, whereas the some-college differential is un-
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completing the second and third years of college indicate no further
increase in income.
Differentials in initial salaries are also worth examining. Mincer
(1970) suggests that the more educated also invest more in on-the-
job training. As a consequence they may have an income profile
that initially lies below that of the less. educated, remains below
for several years dependent on the reciprocal of the rate of return on
training, and rises above thereafter. Our analysis of initial salary
by educational level (not presented here) is consistent with part of
this explanation since we find that in 1946, 1947, and 1948 the
starting salary of high school graduates is nearly the same as that
of college graduates, that graduate students receive less than
college graduates, and finally that those with some college may
earn more than those with a college degree.8 Since in any year
the more educated among the initial job applicants will tend to be
older, and since experience adds to income, these results do imply
that the earnings profile of the less educated initially lies above
that of the more educated. On the other hand, from 1955 to 1969
the growth rates in income of those with a college degree, some
graduate work, and a master's degree were essentially the same
(although there was still a tendency for faster growth at higher
educational levels), which suggests that differences in investment
in on-the-job training were not very great at these levels.
The role of mental ability
We have extensively analyzed the role of ability, using the factors
mentioned above that represent mathematical ability, coordination,
verbal ability, and spatial perception.9 To allow for nonlinear ef-
fects, we divided each factor into fifths, which may be closer to
all the people in the sample received some vocational training in the
Air Force. If this training is more important for people with no college, the
comparisons of starting salary would not be appropriate for the civilian popu-
lation. However, some of the vocational training would also benefit those who
went to college. Most of the high school graduates began work in 1946, but a
few were discharged later.
9order of importance in factor, the verbal measure is a weighted average of
tests entitled mechanical principles, reading, general information —pilot,gen-
eral information —navigator,math B, and spatial orientation II. As described
in Thorndike and Hagen (1959), these tests contain such elements as verbal
fluency, reasoning, and mathematical skills (see Appendix B). However, knowl-
edge of mechanical principles is contained in the general information— pilot
and reading comprehension tests as well as in the first item.Education, income, and human behavior100
populationtenths for the verbal and for the mathematical factors
since only those in the top half of the mental-ability distribution
were allowed into the test program. We found that of these ability
measures, only mathematical ability is a significant determinant
of earnings.'0
In light of some recent literature on the distribution of income
(Lydall, 1969), it is interesting to consider the relative importance
of the effects of education and ability over time. In Table 4-2 we
present estimates of the extent to which earnings of a high school
graduate in each of the five ability levels differ from the earnings
of the average high school graduate in our sample. In 1955 those in
the top fifth earned about 9 percent more than the average, and
those in the bottom fifth earned about 8 percent less, whereas in
1969 the corresponding figures were 15 and —10 percent.1'
Thus over time, the income of those in the top fifth has risen faster
than the income of those at the low end of the ability scale, and for
those in the middle fifths the growth rate has been about the same
as that of the average high school graduate in this sample. In 1955
the 17 percent differential between the top- and bottom-ability
fifths is greater than the differentials attributable to education,
except for the M.D. and LL.B. categories (see Table 4-1). In 1969
'0The second fifth was not significant, but the other three were (the omitted class
was the bottom fifth).
dollar effect of 'ability on education is the same at each educational level
(except in. 1969 for high-ability people who attended graduate school); hence










high school graduates in
1955 1969
Some college 11 17
Undergraduate degree5 12 31





* Forthose not teaching elementary or high school.
t All table entries are significant at the 5 percent level except for this one. See Appendix
B for the underlying equation.
SOURCE:All data inthesetables are from NBER-Thorndike sample.Education as an investment and a screening device101
the25 percent differential is greater than the differential for some
college and is quite close to the differentials at all educational levels
except LL.B. and M.D. Since our sample was drawn only from the
top half of the ability distribution, it is almost certain that for those
who are at least high school graduates, ability is a more important
determinant of the range of the income distribution than education
is. 12
Asfar as the interaction between ability and education is con-
cerned, we find practically no evidence of any difference in the
effect of ability at the various educational levels in 1955, although
there is some evidence that in 1969 those with graduate training
in the second-highest (and to some extent highest) ability groups
received more income from ability than those at lower educational
levels)3 However, we also find ability to be an important deter-
minant of earnings even for high school graduates.
Finally, in our study of initial salaries, we find that mental ability
has no effect on income except for those with graduate training.
Together with the Table 4-2 results, this indicates that ability ini-
tially has little effect on earnings but that over time the effect grows,
and perhaps grows more rapidly for those with graduate training
and high ability.'4
These conclusions on ability and education suggest the following
'2This comparison assumes that the bias from all omitted variables is affecting
the education and ability coefficients in the same proportion. This assumption
may be inappropriate for college quality, which is highly correlated with
mental ability, as discussed below.
'3lnteraction between ability and education would mean that the joint effects of
particular combinations of ability and education subgroups are different from
what would have been predicted by simply adding the separate independent
effects of the two variables.
For example, if it were shown that those in the top ability fifth averaged
$1,000 more income than those in the average ability fifth, whether or not
they went to high school or college, there would be no interaction between
education and ability. If, however, this $1,000 income differential was an
average result of a $500 differential for those with a high school education
and a $1,500 differential for those with graduate training (as compared with
people in the average ability fifth), then interaction between ability and edu-
cation would exist.
Although there appears to be a significant interaction between graduate
education and the top two ability fifths, it is not shown among our measures
because of lack of space.
'4Hause (1972) finds a significant interaction between IQ and education in the
NBER-Th sample, and since this finding is at odds with ours, it is approp-
Hate to compare the studies. Hause began his work after we had finished this
portion of our study, and in the interval the variable used by Hause and labeledEducation, income, and human behavior102
typeof model for the labor market: For most jobs, firms either
have little or no idea of what determines success or must en-
gage in so much training and testing that the initial output of all
employees without previous experience is similar. In either case
firms pay all those in comparable positions the same amount
initially and then monitor performances and base promotions and
income on accomplishment. Since the highly educated and able
perform better and win promotions sooner, the model can be de-
scribed as one of upward filtration. Such a model is consistent
with the human capital concept, but it suggests a somewhat dif-
ferent interpretation of empirical results and somewhat different
directions for research. It provides an explanation other than learn-
ing by doing for the shape of the age-income profile, whereas a
natural extension of the model in which firms try to minimize in-
formation costs leads to the screening model discussed below.
A criticism that has been made of many education studies is that
the education coefficients are biased upward because relevant
abilities and other characteristics have not been held constant.
We can obtain an estimate of this bias by observing how the
IQ was created; this IQ variable differs from any of our factors. Tests we have
conducted with our full sample indicate that if the test scores are entered
linearly, the JQ variable yields a higher R2 in the earnings equation than our
first factor does. But if the test scores are entered in the general nonlinear
dummy-variable fashion, the reverse is true. Since the test scores are an ordinal
index, it is appropriate that an allowance be made for general nonlinear effects.
Hause did not allow for such effects, but instead specified a double-logarithmic
earnings function. Thus the finding by Hause of an "interaction" between
ability and education may be attributable to his selection of a restrictive func-
tional form.
An alternative possibility is that the difference in results is due to the sample
truncation procedures used by Hause. He excludes the self-employed from the
analysis and also eliminates cases with reported incomes more than three stan-























NOTE:See Appendix B for the underlying equations. The average age in the sample
is 33 in 1955 andin 1969.Education as an investment and a screening device103
educationcoefficients change when ability is omitted from our
equations.'5 We have calculated the bias in two ways: first, as-
suming that each factor was the only type of ability that should be
excluded, and second, assuming that all abilities should be ex-
cluded. In both instances we find that only the omission of mathe-
matical ability leads to a bias of any magnitude. In 1955 the bias
on the education coefficients due to omitting mathematical ability
was about 25 percent, varying from a low of 15 percent for some
college to a high of 31 percent for a master's degree. In 1969 the
biases were somewhat smaller, averaging about 15 percent and
ranging from 10 percent to 19 percent.'6 The decline in the bias
over time occurs because the coefficients on ability did not grow as
rapidly between 1955 and 1969 as those on education did.'7 In
some studies, rates of return have been calculated using differences
in average income between educational groups at various age levels.
In this sample such a procedure would overstate the earnings dif-
ferentials from higher education by 35 and 30 percent in 1955 and
1969, respectively.
Other variables
Several sociodemographic and background variables are statisti-
cally significant and important determinants of income. For ex-
ample, the difference between excellent and poor health in 1969
was worth $7,000 a year, and the 100 individuals who were single
earned about $3,000 a year less than others.'8 Those whose
fathers had at least a ninth-grade education earned about $1,200
more in 1969 and $300 more in 1955 than those whose fathers had
'5However, one of our important variables is a mixture of background and
ability; thus we can calculate the upper and lower bounds of the bias only by
omitting ability. For simplicity in this summary, we use the average of these
bounds. The bias is expressed later as the ratio of the difference in the education
coefficients (with ability excluded and included) to the education coefficient
when ability is excluded.
16The 15 percent bias for the some-college category is higher than in other studies
and may be due to our use of mathematical ability rather than IQ.
'7The bias may also be expressed in terms of the coefficient of education in an
equation relating ability to education, but since this equation would involve
the same people in 1955 and 1969 and since their education changed only
slightly, the coefficient would be virtually unchanged in the two years.
1969 the people were asked to indicate the state of their health as being
poor, fair, good, or excellent. The effects of these categories were statistically
significant and approximately linear in 1969—and, interestingly, also in 1955
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notentered high school. In Table 4-i's format those whose fathers
had a bachelor's degree added $700 and $4,000 in 1955 and 1969,
respectively. The other background information is contained in a
biography variable constructed by Thorndike and Hagen from
data on hobbies, family income, education prior to 1943, and
mathematical ability. We find the fourth and fifth (highest) and
either the second or third fifths of the biography variable to be
significant —of about the same magnitude as mathematical ability
—and thus to be as important as educational differences in ex-
plaining the range of earnings. In 1955 the age variable was
significant and large numerically, while in 1969 its effect was
negative and insignificant. This is consistent with the common
notion that a rising age-income profile reaches a peak after the age
of 40.
Although the results discussed above were obtained from analy-
sis of separate cross sections, it is possible to develop a combined
measure of motivation, drive, personality, and whatever other char-
acteristics persist over long periods of time by using the residuals
generated in one cross section (denoted by Q)asa variable in the
equations in another cross section. In each year the inclusion of Q
raisedthe R2 from about .10 to.33 and reduced the standard error
of estimate by 15 percent, leaving the other coefficients un-
changed.'9 Thus we conclude that about two-thirds of the variation
in earnings in any year represents either random events, such as
luck, or changes in underlying characteristics.
Further examination of the residuals from the regression equa-
tions leads to the following conclusions: First, although the equa-
tions do not explain well the very high incomes of the most success-
ful, the estimates of extra income arising from education are only
slightly altered if the very successful are excluded. Second, when
the sample is divided up by education and ability, a test for con-
stancy of the residual variance is rejected at the 5 percent level.20
However, when the equations are estimated weighting each ob-
'9The relatively low R2 occurs partly because of the very limited range of
education in our sample and of age in each cross section. For example, merging
the two data sets but allowing for separate coefficients in each would raise the
R2 to about .30. The other coefficients are the same because Q is necessarily
orthogonal to the other independent variables in 1955, and these are essentially
the same as the variables used in 1969.
20 when we use the log earnings as our dependent variable or include Q
in our equations, we reject the hypotheses of constant variance and of normally
distributed errors.Education as an investment and a screening device105
servation by the reciprocal of the standard error of its ability-
education cell, the coefficients and conclusions reached above are
changed very little.
Quality of schooling
We have explored briefly the effects of including an educational
quality variable in the NBER-TH regressions2' by using the Gour-
man academic rating, which attempts to measure the quality of
undergraduate departments, in the form of fifths of the sample dis-
tribution.22 At the some-college and B.A. levels, only the highest
quality fifth affects earnings significantly, whereas for graduate
students, earnings are affected by the top two undergraduate school
21 Since the quality data became available to us at a much later date than the
other data, we have not attempted to incorporate the quality implications in the
rate-of-return calculations. Of course the direction of the effect is obvious. Lewis
Solmon is currently examining the quality question in great detail.
22This rating is defined in Gourman (1967).
TABLE4-3




whi:hmonthly Undergraduatequality 1—4 161 14
earningsin 1969 Undergraduatequality 5f 442 37
exceedearnings
oftheaverage Undergraduatedegree
highschool Undergraduatequality 1—4 340 29
graduate in Undergraduatequality 5t 457 39 thesample
Somegraduates 166 14
M.A.4 194 16





Undergraduate quality 4t 182 15
Undergraduate quality 5t 268 23
Graduate quality 5t 267 22
*Expressedas a percentage of the average income of high school graduates.
t Significantly different from earnings of comparable people who attended schools
in the bottom fifths of quality.
* For those at an undergraduate school in the bottom three quality fifths and a grad.
uate school in the bottom four. These regression results are based on a sample of
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fifthsand the top graduate school fifth. The 1969 results, sum-
marized in Table 4-3, indicate that differences in income at a given
educational level attributable to college quality effects are very
large. For example, the college dropout in the top quality fifth re-
ceives more income than anyone not in the top fifth except for those
with a three-year graduate degree.23 Similarly,the three-year
graduate degree holder, depending on school quality, earns any-
where from 53 to 98 percent more than the average high school
student.
The quality variable may be important for several reasons. First,
high-quality schools can impart different or additional income-
earning skills as compared with low-quality schools. Second, the
quality as well as the quantity of education may be used as a screen-
ing device, as we describe later.24 Finally, one of Gourman's
stated objectives in providing the quality ratings is to permit
students to match their capabilities, as reflected by S.A.T. ratings,
with schools. If individuals' S.A.T. ratings and school quality
ratings were perfectly correlated, then the quality rating would be
reflecting mental-ability differences rather than differences in the
quality of education provided by the school. Evidence in Wolfie and
Smith (1956) and Solmon (1969) indicates that school quality and
average IQ of those attending are positively correlated, but that
within schools there is a wide range of individual abilities. In addi-
tion, evidence in Astin (1968) indicates that schools are differen-
tiated by characteristics of their students other than mental ability
and that schools have different attitudes toward various forms
of social and psychological behavior. Thus the quality variable
may reflect individual mental-ability differences not captured in our
personal-ability measures; it may reflect other personality dif-
ferences or quality-of-schooling differences.
THERATE OFThedata for 1955 and 1969, as well as the initial job earnings
that have been mentioned briefly, yield information at three points
on the age-earnings profile for those in our sample. It is possible
to interpolate for the intervening years on the basis of various
data collected by the census and to extrapolate beyond 1969 (when
the people in the sample averaged 47 years of age) to obtain
23 groupincludes PhD's, lawyers, and M.D.'s.
24 ofthe schools included in the top undergraduate quality fifth are
Berkeley, Brown, Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, Minnesota, M.I.T.,
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"realized"or ex post age-earnings profiles by educational level.25
We have constructed such profiles for a person with the character-
istics of the average high school graduate in the sample. The
differences between these profiles together with information on
the costs of education are used to estimate rates of return to
education.26
Private and social rates of return may differ for a number of
reasons, including the fact that earnings are subject to taxes, that
costs of education are not necessarily borne by the one who is being
educated, and that there are market imperfections based on edu-
cation (as indicated earlier). If social nonmonetary returns and mar-
ket imperfections are ignored, differences between our estimates
of private and social rates of return occur because the private
benefits are calculated after deducting income taxes from earnings
and because social costs include the total (per-student) expendi-
tures on higher education rather than just average tuition.27 How-
ever, our estimated social and private rates are very similar be-
cause the (before-tax) income streams are the same, and the largest
cost component in each instance is forgone earnings.28 In this
discussion, therefore, we concentrate on estimates of the social
rates of return calculated after deflation by the CPI from nominal
profiles. These rates are presented in Table 4-4 along with nominal
private rates.
Compared with the social rate of return to a high school graduate
having the same abilities and background, the social rates of return
realized in our sample (before deflation) are 14, 10, 7, 8, and 4 per-
25details see Taubman and Wales (forthcoming, App. J)
26Earnings provide an inadequate measure of benefits from education if there
are nonmonetary returns that vary by educational levels. In our estimates we,
in effect, add to the incomes of elementary and high school teachers a large
nonpecuniary return. Without this adjustment the rates of return would be
smaller at the undergraduate and master's level. No other adjustments are made
for nonmonetary returns or for consumption benefits.
27 details of construction of the cost estimates can be found in Taubman
and Wales (forthcoming, App. L). The foregone earnings are estimated from
the sample.
28These returns, which are not very sensitive to small changes in the data,
are calculated under the following assumptions: First, we do not include GI
education benefits as offsets to forgone earnings since we want rate-of-return
estimates that are applicable to the population as a whole. Second, we assume
that, as in our sample, the average age of people about to undertake higher
education in 1946 was 24. However, we also calculate a rate of return for
people who are identical to those in the sample but who were 18 in 1946. Since
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cent for two years of college only, an undergraduate degree, some
graduate work, a master's degree, and a Ph.D., respectively.29 The
most striking aspect of these results is the general decrease in the
rate of return with increases in education, which holds even though
we have adjusted for the large nonpecuniary reward to precollege
teachers who are concentrated in the B.A., some-graduate, and
master's categories. On the other hand, nonpecuniary returns may
be contributing to the low return in the Ph.D. category, which in-
cludes college professors. Rates of return calculated without stan-
dardizing for ability and background, although not presented here,
are generally about 20 percent higher; for example, the some-college
return rises from 14 to 18 percent. These rates of return, based on
current dollar profiles, differ from those based on constant dollar
profiles because inflation increases the absolute differences between
the profiles and alters the purchasing power of the investment
"costs" and "dividends." Estimates of real rates of return, obtained
by deflating by the CPI, are two to three percentage points lower.
A surprising result is that the rate of return to a college drop-
out exceeds that to a college graduate. This result might in part be
attributed to the heavy concentration in the some-college category of
self-employed individuals whose earnings probably include a return
to financial capital.Includinga dummy variable for people who
were business owners in 1969, we find that the percentage earnings
differential, compared with that of the average high school gradu-
Ph.D. category does not include self-employed professionals.
30The questionnaire did not specify whether "earnings" included profits, but it





by CPI by CPI by CPI
Some college 15 14 11
BA. 11 10 8
Some graduate 8 7 5
Master's 8 8 6
Ph.D. 4 4 2
LL.B. 12 11 9
Some collegetoBA. 7 7 5
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ate,is unchanged for college dropouts but is increased by 25 per-
cent for college graduates who are not business owners. Hence, if
this 25 percent adjustment is appropriate (and holds at all ages),
the rate of return to obtaining a B.A. but not becoming a business
owner is about the same as for a college dropout.3'
Of course, even finding that college dropouts receive as high a
rate of return as college graduates is not in accord with findings by
others, such as Becker (1964). This difference may be due partly
to the fact that in other studies ability is not held constant. The
results are therefore influenced by those who drop out of college
because they do not have the intelligence, drive, or other attributes
to handle the work. But since the college dropouts in our sample
were in their mid-twenties in 1946, many probably had a family to
support and could not afford (in the short run) a college degree.
Thus they may have been "pulled" out of college by attractive alter-
natives rather than "pushed" out by lack of drive and motivation.
For example, a small number of respondents in the sample went on
(understandably!) to become airline pilots, a well-paying occupation
that does not require a college degree. The results reported here,
however, do not depend on this special characteristic of the data.
As explained earlier, except for those with graduate training,
there is no evidence of an interaction between ability and education
in determining earnings. Further, since the data on initial earnings
(although they are "recalled" estimates and hence less accurate)
indicate that ability does not affect initial earnings, forgone earnings
do not vary by ability level. Therefore, except for those with gradu-
ate training, the rates of return discussed above apply to individuals
at all ability levels in our sample. For those with graduate training,
differences in the rates of return between those in the top two and
those in the bottom mathematical ability fifths are approximately
two percentage points (centered about the average).32
31However, this dummy-variable procedure understates the true return to some
college if obtaining that educational level increases the likelihood that the mdi-
vidual will become a businessman. On the other hand, our sample information
about the self-employed obviously does not include data on those who failed
earlier in life; thus the dummy-variable coefficient overstates the average return
to being self-employed and may overstate the return to education.
32In Taubman and Wales (forthcoming) we also calculate rates of return using
data from the 1949 census and 1946 data in H. Miller (1960) but with adjust-
ments for the omission of ability and other variables. The rate of return to col-
lege graduates in both these cross sections and the some-college rate in the
1946 sample are close to the realized real rates given above. For the some-col-
lege group, the 1949 cross section yields a much smaller estimate than the time-
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Areinvestments in education worthwhile? From a social point of
view this question involves comparing our social rates of return
with alternative returns available to society. Assuming a fixed
amount of saving and investment in society, the appropriate alterna-
tive rate is that obtainable on physical investment, which is usually
thought to be about 13 to 15 percent in real terms (see Phelps,
1962; Taubman & Wales, 1969). Thus when consumption benefits
and externalities are ignored, there is overinvestment in the educa-
tion of males from society's viewpoint, except perhaps for the some-
college category and college graduates who are not self-employed.
However, if society were to raise the funds through taxation or debt
issues without affecting private investment, the risk-free discount
rate (probably about 4 percent) would be the appropriate alternative
marginal time-preference rate (see Arrow & Lind, 1970). On these
grounds, investments in education are worthwhile from society's
viewpoint, especially since we have not allowed for either exter-
nalities or the consumption value of education. (See the chap-
ters in Part Two of this volume for examination of a number of
externalities.)
From a private viewpoint, however, the appropriate alternative
return is best represented by an after-tax ex post rate of return on
common stocks—say, about 10 percent. Since the private after-tax
rates of return differ from the before-tax rates by less than one per-
centage point, we conclude that (in addition to some college) ob-
taining a B.A. or LL.B. degree is a profitable investment, although,
subject to the qualifications on the college-dropout results men-
tioned earlier, it would be better to drop out after two years of
college. The private return to education is more profitable relative
to alternative assets than the social return because of the various
subsidies given to higher education.
EDUCATIONTheanalysis of earnings differentials and rates of return to educa-
SCREENINGtionhas been conducted without considering the ways in which
DEVICEeducationmight increase income. Becker and others have shown
that if education produces additions to an individual's cognitive or
affective skills, his income will increase. However, a number of
people have asserted that a primary role of education is to serve as a
credential, particularly in the highly paid managerial and profes-
sional occupations.33
33See, for example, Griliches and Mason (1972), Hansen et al. (1970), and
Thurow and Lucas (1972). For lower-paying occupations such as skilled La-
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Underwhat circumstances will such screening result in extra
earnings for the more educated, and how will it affect the calcula-
tions of the social rate of return to education? Suppose that a person
is paid his marginal product in any occupation in which he works
and that education, mental ability, and other personal character-
istics add to an individual's marginal productivity. As long as these
factors affect marginal productivity differently in various occupa-
tions, we can speak meaningfully of high- and low-wage occupa-
tions. To demonstrate that education is being used to screen people
out of high-paying occupations, we must show that some people
with less education are not in the occupation in which their mar-
ginal product and earnings could be maximized and that, on the
other hand, highly educated people are allocated more efficiently.
If education is used to screen people, the extra earnings a person
receives from education are due both to the skills produced by
schooling and to the income redistribution effect resulting from
supply limitations. But since the latter is not a gain to society, the
social return will apparently be less than the private return to ed-
ucation. l'his conciusion, however, overlooks one particularly im-
portant component of the problem, which can best be considered
by asking why firms use education as a screening device. There
are several possible answers, including snobbery and a mistaken
belief in the true importance of education. On the other hand, the
use of such credentials may be motivated by a desire for profit
maximization. Suppose that successful performance (in the man-
agerial or sales occupation, for example) depends upon the individ-
ual's possessing a complex set of talents and skills, only some of
which can be measured easily by appropriate tests. Clearly, firms
could attempt to develop and use tests in recruiting people with
the necessary skills for particular occupations. But developing
tests, examining recruits, and incurring performance errors can be
expensive. Alternatively, suppose that firms either know (from
past experience) or believe that a significantly larger percentage
of college graduates have the desired complex of skills.34 They may
then, to save on hiring costs and mistakes on the job, decide to use
information on educational attainment, available at a near zero
cost, as a preliminary screening device.
The implications for the social rate of return are clear: If educa-
tional screening was not permitted, firms would have to use addi-
the larger percentage could occur either because education produces
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tionalresources in order to sort people. Hence any sorting costs
saved by using education as a screening device are a benefit to
society and must be taken into account when comparing the social
and private rates of return. In this chapter we do not attempt to
estimate the magnitude of these costs, but we do obtain a rough
estimate of the contribution of screening to income differentials.
The case for screening can be summarized as one of market
failure, arising from the lack of knowledge or the cost of obtaining
it. Some people with whom we have discussed this problem believe
that firms could obtain the benefits of screening without paying the
costs of hiring college graduates by hiring high school graduates
on the basis of a test predicting whether they would succeed in
finishing college. Although extra sorting costs would be involved,
these would be small compared with the costs of hiring college grad-
uates, given the earnings differentials we attribute below to screen-
ing. Since firms that hired only high school graduates would have
lower costs and higher profits, other firms would soon stop paying
a premium to college graduates, and the screen would be eroded.
There are several responses to this argument. First, even if the
screening function were to vanish in the long run, its consequences
would be observable before then.35 Second, even when there is a
profit to be made by discovering and exploiting available informa-
tion, the actual discovery may not occur for many years.36 Thus,
the use of education as a screening device is certainly not a proposi-
tion which should be rejected out of hand.
To test for the existence of screening, we compare the actual
35Analogously, in the long run with perfect competition there are no excess
profits or rates of return on capital. But in the short run, while capital is being
expanded, excess profits could exist and be measured.
36See, for example, the first part of this chapter. The two largest and richest
samples for investigating the rate of return to higher education net of the effect
of ability and family background are the Woifle-Smith and the NBER-TH
samples, both of which were available in the 1950s. The only prior analysis of
the Woffle-Smith data consists of their original few cross-tabulations for males
(1956) with some slight extensions in Denison (1964). The data for people
of Minnesota, we have learned, were intact and accessible at the University
of Minnesota until 1966, but were permanently or temporarily lost when some
operations were moved. The Thorodike-Hagen sample was sitting unused
in a basement at Columbia Teachers College for over a decade, the
fact that it is mentioned in Hunt (1963) and was known at least to Lee Hansen.
Both samples would have provided data for a series of very useful and impor-
tant articles in a highly competitive profession. Why did it take up to 15 years
for these data sources to be resurrected?Education as an investment and a screening device113
occupationaldistribution of individuals at various educational
levels with the distribution "expected" under free entry. The basic
assumption made in estimating the expected distribution is that
each individual selected the (broad) occupational category in which
his income was the highest. Of course, an individual works in only
one (main) occupation at a time. To estimate earnings in any other
occupation, we make use of occupational regressions, examples of
which are given in Appendix B. The coefficients on the various
ability and education variables can be thought of as the valuations
of the extra skills produced by ability and schooling. The socio-
economic variables may be proxies for other dimensions of skills,
and their coefficients interpretable in the same way, although other
explanations are possible. Given the earlier discussion of the speci-
ficity of the skills produced by education, it is encouraging to find
that education (and ability) has larger coefficients in the managerial,
professional, and sales occupations than in the others.
Using the occupation equations, we can estimate the individual's
potential income in a particular (mth) occupation as the mean
income of people in that occupation who have the same education,
ability, and other characteristics that he does. But since we do not
have measures of all individual characteristics, the potential earn-
ings for each individual will be distributed about this mean. We
assume that the distribution of the residuals in our occupational
regressions would also hold for people with any given set of per-
sonal characteristics currently in any other occupation. Finally,
we assume that for any individual, the earnings distributions about
the mean in various occupations are independent. The latter is a
conservative assumption that biases our results against accepting
the screening hypothesis. That is, if the distributions about the
means are positively correlated, people who earn more in one occu-
pation would do so in all others; hence, fewer people would pick
the occupation with the lower mean income.
For simplicity, we assume that the distribution of wages in the
mth occupation (for individuals with the same characteristics as
the i th individual) is normal, with Yjm and variance (7m2. Assuming
income maximization, the probability that the ith individual will
choose the mth occupation is given by
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wherefm is distributed as N(Yim, °m2) andis the cumulative
density of f1.37 If there is a large number of people at the educational
level under consideration, then Pmcanbe interpreted as the ex-
pected fraction of individuals in the mth occupation at that educa-
tional level, and we have an estimate of the distribution of people
by occupation and education that should occur with free entry and
income maximization.
Table 4-5 contains the expected and actual occupational distri-
butions for the high school, some-college, and B.A. categories,
together with the means and standard deviations of the correspond-
ing existing income levels for 1969.38 The most striking result is
that for the high school group, where the actual fractions of people
in the three lowest-paying occupations are considerably greater than
the expected fractions. In the some-college group this result holds
but is less pronounced, whereas for the undergraduate degree
holders the actual and expected distributions are essentially the
same in the lowest-paying occupations.
In general then, under the assumptions of free entry and income
maximization, very few people at any educational level included
in our sample would choose the blue-collar, white-collar, or service
occupations. In practice, however, a substantial fraction (39 per-
cent) of high school graduates, a smaller fraction (17 percent) of
the some-college group, and only 4 percent of the B.A. holders enter
these occupations. Since the discrepancy between the expected
and actual distributions is directly related to education, we conclude
that education itself is being used as a screening device to prevent
those with low educational attainment from entering the high-
paying occupations.39 Table 4-5 also indicates that at each educa-
tional level, the expected fraction exceeds the actual fraction for the
technical and sales categories by about 10 and 14 percentage
points, respectively. As explained later, such constant differences
at each educational level would occur if there were occupation-
specific skills or risk preferences uncorrelated with education.
A risk-averse individual may select his occupation on the basis
371n the calculations 00wasreplaced by the mean plus three standard devia-
tions. If there are only two occupations, the calculations involve the joint prob-
ability of receiving a given wage in the mth occupation and a smaller one in the
other occupation.
almost no one with graduate training in the blue-collar, white-collar,
or service occupations.
39Although not presented here, the same general pattern of results holds for 1955.Education as an investment and a screening device115
TABLE 4-5Expected and actual distribution by education and occupation, 1969
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Column 3Mean Standard
Occupation and Number Actual E.xpected minus income error of
educational levelof peoplefractionfraction column 1 (monthly) income
High school
Professional 11 1.5 9.5 8.0 960 274
Technical 85 11.5 21.0 9.5 1220 577
Sales 56 7.6 22.0 14.4 1,120 548
Blue-collar 211 28.6 1.3 —26.3 844 165
Service 50 6.8 1 .4 —5.4 824 177
White-collar 24 3.3 .5 —2.8 754 127
Managerial 299 40.6 42.4 1.8 1 ,485 907
Some college
Professional 49 5.8 14.8 9.0 1,260 501
Technical 82 9.6 19.1 9.5 1,285 579
Sales 80 9.4 21.8 12.4 1,300 614
Blue-collar 87 10.2 .8 9.4 882 182
Service 32 3.8 1 .2 2.6 840 228
White-collar 21 2.5 .6 —1.9 785 194
Managerial 501 58.8 39.8 —19.0 1,680 884
B.A. .
Professional 257 25.0 17.8 —7.2 1,412 674
Technical 29 2.8 14.1 11.3 1,370 458
Sales 90 8.8 25.5 16.7 1,490 865
Blue-collar 18 1.8 .9 —.9 950 244
Service 11 1.1 .9 —.2 920 244
White-collar 11 1 .1 .4 —.7 840 212
Managerial 610 59.4 38.3 —21.1 1,850 911
of the variability of income as well as the mean; thus it might be
argued that our estimates of the expected fractions for the low-
paying occupations are too small because we have not allowed for
the attractiveness of the small standard error of income in these
occupations (see Table 4-5, columns 5 and 6). This is a plausible
reason for believing that our estimates of the expected fractions
may be in error for any particular educational level. But unless
high school graduates are more averse to risk, it does not explain
the differences between actual and expected fractions that prevailEducation, income, and human behavior116
acrosseducational levels, since occupational standard errors do
not differ much by education.40 If there are differences in risk
preference, then our previous estimates of the rate of return to
education would be biased upward since an income-determining
characteristic correlated with education would not have been held
constant.
There is, however, an alternative plausible explanation for our
results. Since we can observe an individual in only one occupation,
we calculate his expected earnings in other occupations from the
mean and variance of people with the same set of measured charac-
teristics, e.g., education, ability, and age. Unfortunately, these
measured characteristics explain only a small portion of the vari-
ance in earnings in the various occupations. Some of the unex-
plained variance undoubtedly occurs because of luck or other tem-
porary factors, but the rest occurs because some types of skills,
talents, and abilities have not been measured. For simplicity, if all
these unmeasured skills are represented by a single variable X,
then in the implementation of the test for screening we are assum-
ing that the mean and variance of X are the same in each occupa-
tion.41
if X is more important for performance in one occupation than
in others, we would expect the effect of X on earnings to be higher
in this occupation, which in turn should induce more people with
X to choose employment in it. But unless Xis correlated with educa-
tion, we shall estimate an equal "misallocation" of people at all
educational levels. However, if both X and education are highly
rewarded in a particular occupation, then it is not appropriate to
use the mean earnings of that occupation to estimate the potential
earnings in it of people who are outside it (since the average level
of X differs). To the extent that this problem is important, we over-
state in our calculations the fraction of high school and some-college
people in the high-paying occupations and thus obtain an upper
bound to the importance of screening.
We have no way of determining the importance of the omitted
variables, nor do we know of any studies that would be informative.
40The chapter by Lewis Solmon in this volume suggests that high school gradu-
ates may well be more risk-averse than college graduates.
41 actuallyrequire the equality of mean and variance of d1X1, where d is the
effect of X on earnings intheith occupation. But the most likely reason for X
to have the same distribution over all occupations is that theare equal
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Nevertheless,it is of some interest to study the effect of omitting
mental ability since, if the calculations had been performed with
census data, this would have been an obvious candidate for the
omitted (occupation-specific) variable. Indeed, in our equations
we do find that mathematical ability has a bigger effect on earnings
in the higher-paying occupations. The omitted-variable argument•
would lead us to expect that the larger the fraction of people at each
educational level in the managerial occupation, the higher the
ability level, and to expect high school graduates who are managers
to be, on the average, more able than other high school gradu-
ates. Analysis of our sample indicates that both these expectations
are borne out, but that the effects are not pronounced. For example,
the mean ability level of managers is .47 and .62 for high school and
college graduates, respectively, while the corresponding means
for all high school and college graduates are .43 and .60.42 Con-
sequently, to the extent that the omission of other occupation-spe-
cific skills follows the same pattern as that of mental ability, the
problems caused by their omission may not be serious.
We can attempt to estimate what the rates of return to education
would have been if there had been no screening.43 These are of
interest because they represent the extent to which the returns
presented earlier reflect increases in productivity rather than dis-
crimination in the job market. To calculate returns to education,
we weight the income differences due to education in various oc-
cupations by the expected distribution of people across occupations.
These returns are upper bounds to those which would actually
occur, since they do not allow for income levels to adjust as the
occupational distributions change. Also, they are unadjusted esti-
mates in that they do not allow for differences in ability, back-
ground, age, etc. However, they can be compared with estimates
obtained using the actual distributions, and the percentage dif-
ferences between these two sets of estimates will probably be
reasonable approximations to differences in returns adjusted for
relevant factors.
We have calculated the percent by which income in the some-
college and B.A. categories exceeds high school income for the
42Those in the top fifth receive a score of .9, and each successive fifth declines
by .2.
43explainedabove, calculation of the social rate requires information on the
sorting costs saved by screening. Since we are assuming these costs to be zero
in our calculations, the social (but not the private) rates will be underestimated.Education, income, and humanbehavior118
actualand expected distributions for 1955 and 1969. In 1955 the
earnings differentials due to education, under the assumption of
no entry barriers, were only about one-half to one-third as large
as actual returns, whereas in 1969 they were about one-half as
large. This suggests that the effect of screening on the returns to
education is in fact substantial at these educational levels and that
without screening, the returns might be 50 percent below those
presented earlier.44
To sum up, the screening model implies that the supply of people
to the high-paying occupations is artificially reduced, resulting
in a redistribution of earnings to the more highly educated. Al-
though this redistribution represents a private gain, a complete
analysis of the social gain requires information on any extra sorting
costs that would be incurred if education could not be used for that
purpose.
CONCLUSIONSOurresults are helpful in determining whether society has over-
invested or underinvested in education. Since none of the deflated
social rates of return presented in Table 4-4 exceeds 11 percent,
and very few exceed even 8 percent, and since the before-tax return
on physical capital is generally thought to be about 13 to 15 percent,
it appears that society has invested too many resources in educa-
tion, assuming that the supply of saving is fixed and that external-
ities are not of major quantitative significance. Further, the rates
are lower, the higher the educational level (excluding lawyers and
M.D.'s), suggesting that the overinvestment is more severe at the
higher levels.45 However, if the externalities or consumption bene-
fits discussed in Part Two of this volume yield large-enough returns,
or if educational investments tend to come out of increased savings,
expenditures on education would be economically justified. Further,
we find that the rates of return at the some-college and B.A. levels
are higher than they would be if there were free entry into the high-
paying occupations. That is, since the part of the return to education
that reflects the income redistribution due to the credential aspect
of education does not benefit society, its effect should be subtracted
from actual rates when studying the question of whether or not
44Moreover, if there were no screening, the forgone earnings of those at the high
school level would have been greater.
45However, to the extent that lower rates at high educational levels reflect non-
pecuniary returns, the overinvestrnent is diminished somewhat.Education as an investment and a screening device119
therehas been overinvestment in education.46 Since we find screen-
ing to be important quantitatively, our conclusion that overinvest-
ment in education has occurred is strengthened.
46However, as mentioned above, if screening were not practiced, the costs to
firms (and society) of finding suitable employees would increase. These costs
are therefore one of the benefits of the existing educational system and should
be included when the income redistribution aspects due strictly to screening
are excluded.
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